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Abstract: Two widely endorsed moral principles – sufficiency and reciprocity – lie at the 
core of existing systems of social protection. The tension between these two principles 
accounts for most political conflicts around the appropriate form of social protection and 
for the contemporary normative crisis of the welfare state. International human rights law 
is also ambiguous on this issue. As a result, the human right to a decent standard of living 
– maybe the most fundamental of all rights – is widely abused. This paper considers sever-
al ways of improving social protection in order to protect this fundamental right. It argues 
for the recognition of a right to a subsistence income, its unconditionality, its constitution-
alization, and reviews several objections from a variety of perspectives. 
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Most people accept the idea that everyone should have enough resources to live a 
decent life. This is the principle of sufficiency. Yet most people also endorse the view 
that we should all contribute to social efforts and that no one should receive bene-
fits without reciprocating. This is the principle of reciprocity3. These two moral prin-
ciples lie at the core of all existing systems of social protection, and the tension 
between them accounts for most political conflicts about the appropriate form of 
social protection as well as the contemporary normative crisis of the welfare state. 
After a brief analysis of the tension between these two principles and its re-
flection in some ambiguities of international law, this paper will suggest three sepa-
rate ways in which social protection could be enhanced, with the aim to ban pov-
erty and a specific kind of exploitation4. The first is the recognition of a right to a 
subsistence income, at least for those who do not earn enough through their jobs 
(section 2). The second is the affirmation of this right’s unconditionality with re-
gard to willingness to work (section 3). The third is its constitutionalization in in-
ternational law (section 4). If those three moves were combined, this paper argues, 
democracy’s capacity to generate social justice would be greatly enhanced and peo-
                                                 
1 This paper has been presented to audiences at the University of Barcelona and at the Hoover Chair of Eco-
nomic and Social Ethics (University of Louvain). For useful comments and remarks, I would like to thank 
Jean-Michel Chaumont, Anne-France Colla, Charles Delmotte, Jurgen De Wispelaere, Filip Dorssemont, 
Daniel Dumont, Iñigo Gonzáles Ricoy, Maxime Lambrecht, Louis Larue, Andrew Lister, Olivier Malay, Miri-
am Ronzoni, François Vandamme, Yannick Vanderborght and Philippe Van Parijs. 
2 FNRS Research Fellow, University of Louvain (Belgium) 
3 For empirical evidence of the wide acceptance of these two principles, see Forsé & Parodi, 2004. 
4 I will use the term exploitation in its popular understanding as characterized by an insufficient wage for the 
task performed rather than a matter of surplus value extraction or ownership of the means of production. On 
this popular account of exploitation, it is the vulnerability entailed by the necessity to satisfy one’s basic needs 
that forces people to accept exploitative wages. See Vandamme, 2014. 
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ple subjected to economic vulnerability would be made much better-off. The con-
clusion considers second best issues, i.e. situations where only one or two of the 
recommendations can be satisfied. 
 
 
SUFFICIENCY AND RECIPROCITY IN SOCIAL PROTECTION 
 
The principles of sufficiency and reciprocity clash whenever one begins wondering 
whether a person is responsible for her poverty. If that person is refusing to take 
available jobs and prefers living off welfare benefits, it seems that reciprocity is 
violated and that the sufficiency claim loses strength. Yet people disagree im-
portantly about the appropriate balance between the two conflicting goals of 
fighting poverty and exploitation, on the one hand, and fostering reciprocity on the 
other hand. Historically, capitalist societies have thus always adopted an ambiguous 
attitude towards unemployment: a strange mix of pity and blame. In order to get 
rid of their pity without harming reciprocity, the rich once imagined giving work 
vouchers to the begging poor: a right to work for a (minimal) remuneration instead 
of traditional alms (Loriaux, 2015: 60). The activation of the unemployed in ad-
vanced welfare state is somehow reminiscent of this ancient practice: no charity 
without reciprocity. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the European 
Social Charter (ESC) are also ambiguous regarding the articulation of these two 
principles. Although they recognize a right to an adequate standard of living (Arti-
cle 25 of the UDHR and 11 of the ICESCR) and a right to social security for the 
workers (Article 22 of the UDHR and 9 of the ICESCR), they remain relatively 
silent about the rights enjoyed by the unemployed. Whereas social insurance is 
mandatory, social assistance does not seem so. What is more, nothing seems to 
preclude the suspension of rights for those who do not abide to the conditions 
always attached to welfare benefits, which go from the obligation to work (workfare) 
to the obligation to actively look for work (punitive activation5). The revised ESC is a 
clear example. Although Principle 13 recognizes a right to social (and medical) 
assistance to “anyone without adequate resources”, the Charter further specifies 
that states should provide assistance only to “any person who is without adequate 
resources and who is unable to secure such resources either by his own efforts or from other 
sources” (Article 13 (1), my emphasis), which clearly opens the door to “responsi-
bilist” exclusions from welfare benefits and manifests a suspicious attitude toward 
the claimants. As a result, the principle of sufficiency can be violated without any 
evident violation of human rights6. Although states are required to take appropriate 
                                                 
5 Activation policies exist in many forms. Most of them use economic sanctions, yet some only aim at helping 
the unemployed find their way back to employment without the threat of sanctions. See Dumont, 2011. Thus, 
I will use the term “punitive activation” to target more accurately the kind of activation policies that I find 
morally objectionable. 
6 One could judge that the right to an adequate standard of living is violated, but this is certainly not the main-
stream interpretation, as international human rights law is ambiguous about this right’s (un)conditionality. 
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steps in order to achieve full employment (Article 6 (2) of the ICESCR; Article 1(1) 
of the ESC), they are not prevented from cutting some people off welfare benefits 
if some obligations (of reciprocity) are not respected by the claimants.  
Now, what is the value of civil, political, economic and cultural rights for in-
dividuals whose basic needs are not met? How can human dignity be preserved 
when some people start their day wondering how they will have access to food or 
where they are going to sleep the following night? It seems that the satisfaction of 
basic needs should have priority over all other rights. This is what John Rawls was 
referring to when talking about the “equal value” of rights and the priority of a 
social minimum over the principle of equal liberties and his other distributive prin-
ciples of justice (Rawls, 1993: 7). 
The fundamental thesis of this paper is that sufficiency should also have pri-
ority over the principle of reciprocity (which does not amount to rejecting the very 
idea of reciprocity). Are you in a position to reciprocate when you are striving to 
survive? Certainly not the way people who have access to well-paid and rewarding 
jobs are. Depending on our skills and background, we are very unequal before a 
principle requiring contributing to social efforts through work. From this point of 
view, prioritizing the principle of sufficiency could be a way of empowering every 
citizen for reciprocity. Once you have enough, others can expect you to do something 
for the community. Yet the appropriate sanction if you do not is certainly not to 
deprive you from the very resources necessary for reciprocating. Social blame ap-
pears much less counterproductive.  
Besides, the interpretation of the principle of reciprocity that makes it man-
datory to contribute through work does not resist critical scrutiny. Opinion surveys 
in the US revealed that most people receiving welfare benefits were moved by a 
work ethic and recognized the principle of reciprocity. They simply did not want to 
accept any working conditions (Anderson, 2004, p. 249). Hence, if people some-
times refuse to work, it has much more to do with the job offer than with a failure 
of reciprocity7. And their right to refuse unsuitable work is undeniable: one cannot 
have a moral obligation to be exploited. Now, although international human rights 
law more or less protects this right to refuse unsuitable employment (Dermine, 
2014), there is bound to be important disagreements about what are and are not 
suitable working conditions. Workers themselves are probably better placed than 
lawyers or civil servants to appreciate the subjective cost of work. And in France, 
for example, 33.7% of workers consider being exploited (Dubet, 2006, p. 116). In 
sum, the principle of reciprocity cannot be translated into a moral obligation to 
work (Vandamme, 2015). At most can it imply a moral obligation to contribute, each 
according to his/her abilities and opportunities, to social efforts. And from this 
viewpoint, a guarantee of sufficiency might do justice to all the people who bring 
their social contribution outside formal employment –through parenting, caring for 
the elderly or doing any kind of socially useful unpaid work–. 
                                                 
7 This becomes clearer yet when you consider the non-monetary benefits of work that cannot be compensated 
by a high unemployment income. See Dubet & Vérétout, 2001. 
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I will come back to the reciprocity objection later on in this article. One 
thing to consider for now is where its appeal comes from. There is certainly an 
evolutionary explanation for its prevalence in many cultures: being aware of free 
riders has most probably constituted an evolutionary advantage (Singer, 1981). Yet 
there might be other reasons for its contemporary resurgence manifest in popular 
support for activation policies. One prominent reason why it is gaining field in 
advanced welfare states compared to the principle of sufficiency is the combina-
tion of democracy and social disintegration. As analyzed by Claus Offe, social soli-
darity is crucial for the collective provision and defense of collective goods such as 
a strong welfare state protecting the vulnerable and the unlucky. Yet democracy, 
through the secret individual ballot, «provides a greater and less expensive oppor-
tunity and even temptation to “opt out” and to obstruct this production than any 
other form of government» (Offe, 1987: 520). You can vote against social solidarity 
without having to justify your decision to your fellow citizens. Hence, if social soli-
darity is weak, if people do not trust each other enough and are particularly afraid 
of free riders, the democratic logic can become antagonist to social protection. The 
temptation grows to pay fewer taxes and count on one’s good fortune (or take 
private insurances). The feeling of collective responsibility for the fate of everyone 
disappears. And this is the case in advanced welfare states, where as a result of the 
evolution of work and the heterogeneization of the population through migrations, 
class solidarity has left the stage to a «process of fragmentation, pluralization, and 
ultimately individualization of socioeconomic conditions and interest dispositions» 
(Offe, 1987: 527). 
Solidarity must rely either on mutual trust or mutual interest. Because of 
competition for scarce jobs and ethnocentrism, mutual trust between workers is 
diminishing. Fear of free riding generalizes and turns into the pathological form of 
reciprocity promoted (in various degrees) by workfare and punitive activation poli-
cies. Mutual interest is also less clear than it used to be. The interests of workers 
depend to a high degree on their form of employment (self-employment or wage 
relation) and on their skills (scarce or not). Hence, we cannot rely on spontaneous 
class solidarity anymore. This is why justice arguments matter, more than ever. 
Under these conditions, this paper argues for a realistic target for the future 
of welfare state capitalism8: an unconditional right to income, at least for those 
temporarily or permanently unable to cover their basic needs through wages. The 
promotion of this right relies on two moral principles: 
 
- Everyone should have enough to live a decent life, exempted of pov-
erty and exploitation; 
- This fundamental human interest cannot be sacrificed for the aggregate 
welfare. 
                                                 
8 Obviously, this does not imply the claim that welfare state capitalism is the best form of economic organiza-
tion. This article endorses a non-ideal perspective with the aim of taming the injustice of contemporary capital-
ism. 
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Although international human rights law recognizes the first principle, it 
leaves it vulnerable to reciprocity considerations, especially because it does not 
accept the second principle. As a matter of fact, the second principle comes in 
tension with the ICESCR’s fourth article, which opens the door, in a utilitarian 
fashion, to some limitations of those rights “for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare”. Workfare and punitive activation policies are thus both justified 
in reference to the moral principle of reciprocity and to the importance of reci-
procity for economic efficiency and the general welfare. I will discuss these two 
aspects later on. 
 
 
LEVELING UP THE RIGHT TO INCOME 
 
The first thing I want to argue is that it would be important for increasing democ-
racy’s justice potential that we recognize a right to an income sufficient for decent 
subsistence and independent from contributions. By this I mean that at least those 
unable to earn enough through the job market should be entitled to an income 
covering their basic needs, even if they have not paid social contributions. There is a 
diversity of ways of meeting this right. You can have genuine full-employment with 
a sufficient minimum wage (or wage subsidies); you can have a guaranteed income 
for the unemployed only; you can instore a universal basic income or a negative 
income tax. I will thus leave aside here most of the discussion about the distinctive 
merits of unconditional unemployment benefits and universal basic income (or 
negative income tax)9. What is necessary for the democratic quest of social justice 
is the protection of social assistance and of a guaranteed individual10 income aimed 
at tackling poverty and exploitation in the absence of full and well-paid employ-
ment. 
 26 out of the 28 members of the EU –Greece and Italy being the excep-
tions– already have such income guarantee, means-tested and conditioned upon 
willingness to work. In the UK, there is income support for people in incapacity to 
work because sick, disabled, pregnant or alone with a young child. In the US, there 
is a “supplemental security income” for the aged, blind or disabled. My normative 
recommendation would be to generalize this kind of income, level it up beyond 
poverty line, and relax eligibility conditions to include all citizens and long-term 
residents lacking income. Where a right to income currently exists, its level of pro-
vision is always under poverty line. It is not in the interests of capital that it be oth-
erwise, as unapologetically confessed by Patrick Colquhoun in the early 19th centu-
ry, in a statement that has not completely lost contemporary relevance: «Without a 
                                                 
9 One point is worth making, though. In light of the social disintegration mentioned above, universality could re-
build wider allegiance to the welfare state and to social rights, alleviating their political fragility. Not because 
everyone will be net beneficiary, but because more people would probably benefit from it than from targeted 
welfare benefits. Yet the global budgetary cost of social protection would clearly be increased if the aim is to 
cover basic needs, which reduces the political immediate feasibility of a full basic income approach. Universali-
ty is thus a possibility, which has some efficiency advantages (Van Parijs, 1990; 1996), but not a necessity. Note 
also that a modest basic income can be combined with more targeted forms of social protection. 
10 Individuality is crucial for avoiding dependence within households. See Alstott, 2000. 
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large proportion of poverty there could be no riches, since riches are the offspring 
of labour, while labour can result only from a state of poverty» (quoted in Marshall, 
1949: 86). 
The first reason for the defense of such right to income is that in capitalist 
economies, the state seldom provides nutrition and housing to the needy. Income 
is the main access to these two social rights. It is also the necessary condition of 
genuine social protection, as it helps decommodifying people’s access to subsist-
ence (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Furthermore, by increasing the bargaining power of 
the potential worker, a guaranteed income plays a decisive role in the fight against 
labor exploitation (Vandamme, 2014).  
Such right should be considered as a central part of social rights, along with 
health care and education. Depending on its level of provision, it could cover part-
ly or completely the rights to housing and nutrition. If decommodification is the 
aim, the guaranteed income should cover basic needs, or be aligned with a standard 
of “decent life”. By the term “subsistence”, I do not mean “mere subsistence”. I 
target something closer to sufficiency, i.e. whatever is necessary to escape all the un-
desirable consequences of poverty. One very rough way of assessing the income’s 
potential to relieve from poverty is to make use of proxies such as the 60% of the 
median national disposable income generally considered as the “poverty line”11. In 
any case, the assessment of the income’s relative and fluctuating calculation could 
be delegated to independent bodies, such as a Human Rights Commission12 in 
charge of determining the appropriate level of (minimal) state provision for all 
social rights (Fabre, 2000: 169). 
Let us now consider the main objections to this proposal. First, is this right 
realistic in the “age of austerity” (Schäfer & Streeck, 2013)? Admittedly, it is im-
possible to consider this right to income without any regard to states’ economic 
capacities, i.e. the amount of expenditures they can afford within a reasonable debt 
level (level which is itself subject to political debate). States’ commitments to social 
rights always include a “resources” proviso, stating that the obligations of the state 
depend on its available resources. The danger is that the austerity argument –‘we 
cannot do otherwise than fail to fulfil our obligations because of recession’– be-
comes too tempting. It is therefore the role of the public to continuously question 
governments’ assessments of their economic capacities and push them towards 
alternative ways of financing social protection. Because, although there is bound to 
be uncertainty about states’ economic capacities, it is reasonable to assume that 
developed welfare states could face such obligation, and if necessary prioritize the 
financing of social protection over other expenditures. Some degree of austerity 
                                                 
11 This proxy assumes homogeneous needs. It will be absolutely necessary to complement such income for 
disabled people at least. Equal resources do not guarantee equal opportunities, people differing in their capaci-
ty to derive well-being from economic resources (Sen, 1992; Cohen, 2011). Yet as a matter of regulation, a 
combination of equal (guaranteed) income and health and education provisions according to needs might be 
the best achievable approximation of justice. 
12 One existing example is the South African Human Rights Commission (http://www.sahrc.org.za/), which is 
governmental. A different one is the International Society for Human Rights, a non-governmental and non-
profit organization which has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN and partici-
pative status with the European Council. See http://www.ishr.org/  
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might be currently unavoidable –which is in itself controversial–, but it is certainly 
not a fatality that the least well-off shoulder its burden. 
In emerging welfare states, the resources argument might be taken differently 
into account. What matters then is a visible commitment to increasing social pro-
tection. The distinct duties that could be faced by states in different contexts re-
garding the right to income can be stated as follows: 
 
 Countries with a developed welfare state could have a positive duty to secure a 
guaranteed minimum income above poverty line and a negative duty not to reduce their 
level of social protection13. 
 Emerging welfare states could have a positive duty to take appropriate steps14 and 
commit in a publicly visible way to progressively bring everyone above the poverty line15 
and the same negative duty not to reduce their level of social protection. 
 
At the supranational level – the EU for example –, countries could face the 
same “internal” duties, possibly supplemented with a positive duty for the federation – or 
federated states if the federation lacks the capacity for action – to help member states unable to 
raise or maintain their level of social protection. 
The main objection to such right to income, besides states’ resources, is the 
partial disconnection between income and work (even if you do not work you 
would be entitled to an income). Some might argue that social rights stem from 
labor participation. They might be willing to accept moral rights to housing, nutri-
tion and social security, but they expect work to provide the access to subsistence 
and security. And they see social protection as protecting workers in their contribu-
tion to economic cooperation. Rather than granting a right to income, should we 
then not strive for full-employment –possibly with compensations for the disabled 
and the temporary unemployed?–. Work engenders social membership and is sup-
posed to provide the income necessary for a decent life. This is the path taken by 
the UDHR and the ICESCR. 
The insistence on a right to income even in the absence of work is precisely 
based on the failing of this argument. Full-employment, far from being the norm, 
would be historically exceptional (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 198), although govern-
ments from the right and left continuously maintain it as a goal. The capitalist 
mode of production is not preferred for its ability to provide work to everyone, but 
for its unrivaled potential to create wealth. By accepting the dominance of private 
property of the means of production, states have actually abandoned effective power 
to regulate the rate of employment. All they can do is provide costly incentives to 
                                                 
13 This is the principle of standstill already recognized by the Belgian constitutional jurisprudence (see Dumont, 
2013) and recognized elsewhere as a principle of “non-regression”. It consists in a negative duty for the state 
not to deprive its citizens from a social advantage that they previously enjoyed, unless required by some over-
arching public interest. 
14 The language of “appropriate steps” is used by the ICESCR. 
15 Article 27 of the South-African Constitution uses the language of sufficiency (“sufficient food and water”) 
and asks the state to “take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights” (health care, food, water and social security). See 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/english-2013.pdf 
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firms to expand and hire. Yet hiring is in the interests of firms only during their 
expansion stage. And at any moment, automatizing work will always prove more 
interesting for them than hiring. Moreover, if it is true that persistent unemploy-
ment increases productivity –the Marxist reserve army of labor thesis–, full-
employment might even be inimical to the very logic of capitalism. 
Furthermore, even if standard economic models of perfectly competitive 
market economies predict equilibrium in which all those who want a job have one, 
various factors make structural involuntary unemployment explainable even under 
idealized conditions of perfect competition (Van Parijs, 1987: 123-127). The cost 
of firing, hiring and training, for example, provides those who have a job with an 
advantage over those who do not even if the latter would be ready to take it for a 
lower wage. Besides, the incentive to productivity provided by a higher wage also 
accounts for the fact that actual wages are superior to market-clearing wages. 
In this situation, it is highly problematic that means of subsistence and social 
recognition stem only –or mainly, depending on countries– from work. It is also a 
problem that because we only recognize a right to work, not to income, govern-
ments can get rid of their obligations by claiming to strive for full-employment. 
The appropriation of natural resources and means of production by a few private 
actors has the effect of excluding some people from the very possibility of earning 
their living through their own work. Hence, if you are endowed with low marketa-
ble skills and you do not own land, the capitalist system pushes you towards ex-
ploitation, unless the state provides you with an exit option. The right to an in-
come independent from work is thus the only way to justify to those who stand to 
lose from it an economic order based on private property and market economy 
(Van Parijs, 1995; Brettschneider, 2006). In a socialist economy, with jobs provided 
exclusively by the state, the right to income might not be necessary. Where means 
of production and land have been monopolized by a few, things are different. 
The UDHR and the ICESCR, which tie the right to social security to the 
right to work must be understood in a historical context of wide employment and 
sustained growth that made the connection between social protection and em-
ployment more obvious than it is now. It is precisely because social insurance has 
not appeared sufficient to protect all citizens from poverty that many European 
countries have adopted minimum income guarantees. The explicit recognition of a 
right to an income independent from contributions aims at eliminating the ambigu-
ity of human rights law and thereby protecting the involuntary unemployed –and 
those who rightly refuse to work under exploitative conditions– against abuses. 
Now, what some people fear, if the battle for full-employment is abandoned, 
is the creation of a dual society, with a class of job holders and another of unem-
ployed people who might not live in poverty but are nonetheless deprived of the 
“goods of work other than money” such as excellence, social contribution, social 
recognition and community inclusion (Gheaus & Herzog, 2016). It is an open 
question (which is not the target of Gheaus and Herzog’s paper) which of these 
non-monetary goods would be accessible only through work in a society where 
work and income would have been partially decoupled. Yet, assuming that some 
goods are accessible only through work, the promoters of a right to income still 
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have means of action at their disposal. They need not completely surrender to 
massive unemployment. Admittedly, an increase of workers’ bargaining power can 
cause further unemployment by raising the cost of work (assuming that this is not 
compensated by increased demand). There is thus a prima facie tension between 
the relief from poverty and exploitation, on the one hand, and a high level of em-
ployment on the other16. Yet these aims can be reconciled, and should be if the 
intergenerational sustainability of the welfare state is at stake. This would entail 
policies such as retraining, public job creation (Harvey, 2014), and/or work shar-
ing. A better distribution of work could be either “forced” by the legal restriction 
of working time, or more spontaneously obtained as an effect of a basic income 
policy allowing people to flexibly reduce their working time (Meade, 1995). What 
makes the right to income approach different from the full-employment approach 
previously rejected is that income security is here prioritized over employment. 
The latter cannot be pursued at the expense of the former. 
Another objection to the right to income concerns the monetary medium. 
Assuming we want to make subsistence independent from the job market, why not 
distribute in-kind resources covering basic needs, such as public housing and pub-
lic canteens (Hazan & Kamo, 2013) or, more modestly, housing vouchers and food 
stamps (Van Parijs, 1995: 41-45; Brettschneider, 2006: 128)? Paternalist or care 
approaches could argue for in-kind as a way to make sure, as a matter of concern for 
disadvantaged people, that they make appropriate choices. Yet income is preferable 
to in-kind as a matter of respect for autonomy and freedom to follow one’s concep-
tion of the good (Brettschneider, 2006: 129-130). Furthermore, we do not tell the 
more advantaged how to use their incomes. Not only is paternalism-for-the-poor-
only discriminatory; it is also offensive to the disadvantaged’s self-respect. 
Another related argument insists on the need for a more radical decommodi-
fication and the responsibility of the state to encourage non-monetary relationships 
between people, through the provision of free services for example17. If we really 
want to free people’s subsistence from market transactions, services appear superi-
or to cash (Panitch, 2011). Yet, besides favoring freedom, markets also foster re-
sponsibility by forcing people to take into account the opportunity cost of their 
choices –which is particularly important regarding the consumption of natural re-
sources–. An appropriate balance must thus be found between cash and services, 
markets and state. Because some goods like health and education should not be 
tradable, it is a good thing that most social rights are nowadays provided in-kind. 
The proposal of a right to income does not aim at substituting services with mon-
ey. Cash and services should rather be combined in a way that satisfies together the 
demands of autonomy and concern, responsibility and community. The aim of this 
paper is not to envision a radical alternative to capitalism –where the state would 
provide free access to all the necessary services, for example–, but a democratically 
                                                 
16 Here again, one advantage of basic income compared to traditional unemployment benefits and social assis-
tance is that it removes the unemployment trap: it always pays off to take a job –even part-time– when you are 
unemployed because the new wage adds to the basic income rather than replacing it. See Van Parijs, 1996. 
17 I thank Olivier Malay for this suggestion. 
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achievable way of tempering its unjust effects –which, I will not always recall in the 
paper, is not sufficient for justice–. 
The proposed right to income would ideally have two further characteristics: 
1) its unconditionality and 2) its constitutionalization. The next sections explain 
their rationale and consider some objections. The first set of objections is familiar 
to people working within theories of justice. The second one is more familiar to 
democratic theorists. The reason why it is interesting to treat these two separate 
issues in the same article is that unconditionality and legal protection are two im-
portant tools for increasing social rights’ protection18. Yet the two characteristics 
are independent of each other. You can accept only one part of the proposal and 
reject the other. 
 
 
UNCONDITIONALITY 
 
The unconditionality of the right to income here defended is to be understood as 
not conditioned upon the claimant’s willingness to work19. There might still be two condi-
tions for its provision. One is the state resources proviso already discussed, as un-
conditionality in this sense is logically unfeasible. The other is the claimant’s re-
sources, as the right to income can (but need not) be means-tested20. The income 
would thus be unconditional in the restricted sense that «no further conditions 
have to be met beyond those establishing eligibility» (Barry, 2005: 151; Dumont, 
2011: 452). Where guaranteed income systems exist, they are never unconditional 
in this sense. Although they can or could seem unconditional in some places, due 
to relaxed controls, they are always linked with a readiness to work for those who 
are able-bodied. And the tendency in contemporary welfare states is to strengthen 
controls in order to activate the unemployed and reduce social protection expendi-
tures (Dermine & Dumont, 2014), with the result of cutting some people off wel-
fare benefits and forcing the others into work. Conditionality is thus a factor of 
poverty and exploitation. How can it be defended? 
The first argument against unconditionality was already touched upon: it is 
the worry that austerity would currently be unavoidable, so that it would be suicidal 
for states to spend a lot of money on an income that –it is argued– disincentivizes 
work. Now, if one effect of a guaranteed income is to somewhat reduce the 
amount of work, consumption and production, this should not worry us too much. 
To the contrary, given the impact of continuous growth on the environment, such 
                                                 
18 Cécile Fabre (2000), for example, considers only the second aspect. Yet she recognizes (private communica-
tion) that legal protection without unconditionality contributes to social rights’ vulnerability. Besides, uncondi-
tionality makes the claim for constitutionalization easier as it facilitates the judges’ task. 
19 White (2003: 139-141) makes a distinction between the unconditionality of the right (to access income 
through reasonable effort) and the unconditionality of the provision of the income, arguing that the former 
does not imply the latter. I reject his very weak understanding of unconditionality, which would have the effect 
of weakening the right itself. 
20 Obviously, if a universal basic income is financed through taxes, not everyone will be a net beneficiary. Yet 
ex-post fiscal control of resources differs from ex-ante means-tested welfare programs in being less intrusive 
and humiliating. 
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reduction might be more than welcome (Barry, 2005: 229). Now, the real challenge 
is the sustainability of the welfare state: social protection should not have the effect 
of reducing state revenues in a way that would jeopardize its financing. Admittedly, 
the amount of the guaranteed income might vary with the state of the economy, 
but we should recognize a bottom line under which the income cannot fall. In bad 
economic times, a special effort will be asked to more advantaged people or less 
crucial expenditures will be reduced. We could, for example, stop subsidizing polit-
ical philosophers, or spend less money for sports, the police or the army. As sug-
gested by Malcolm Langford (2008: 31), in some countries «public expenditures for 
social security are dwarfed by funds allocated to protect personal security, such as 
police and defence», while the respect of social rights is very likely to have a posi-
tive effect on internal security. Fighting tax evasion is another obvious path. In any 
case, there is no reason why those already most disadvantaged should bear a rela-
tively much higher cost –poverty– than their fellow citizens –increased tax burden–. 
The perversity of austerity arguments is that they usually hide matters of political 
priorities behind a sustainability argument. 
A more serious threat to the proposal comes from the prioritarian version of 
this efficiency argument. According to prioritarianism21, what matter primarily are 
the prospects of the least (or less) well-off. From this viewpoint, the incentives to 
work provided by conditional welfare benefits might be preferable to unconditionali-
ty if they work as to improve these prospects (for example by providing the unem-
ployed with a helpful motivation to improve their situation)22. My answer to this 
well taken point is that it might be true that in an “ideal” world, conditionality 
would lead to better expectations for the least well-off, as it would stimulate peo-
ple’s contributive ethos for the benefit of all, yet this seems unlikely in real world 
conditions, as concern for the least well-off is too easily traded-off against maximi-
zation of aggregate wealth and conditionality generally works to the advantage of 
the better-off only. Even if conditionality was not condemnable in principle, we 
should worry about its vulnerability to abuses. In practice, it generally opens the 
door to punishment of the victims (the involuntary unemployed) and labor exploi-
tation through the obligation to accept job offers.  
One could therefore suggest entrenching a prioritarian proviso –or indeed 
the difference principle– into the constitution, proviso stating that the organization 
of social protection must work to the greatest advantage of the least well-off. Con-
ditionality would then be legitimate only if it does so. However, leaving here aside 
practical worries concerning adjudication (Barry, 1995: 95-96), it seems to me that 
such proviso is unlikely to receive before long the democratic support necessary 
for its entrenchment. A subsistence income is more “sufficientarian”, and thus 
more in line with what sociologists consider as most people’s current sense of jus-
tice (see Forsé & Parodi, 2004). Although it is less ambitious, it could already em-
power the vulnerable and lead to more egalitarian legislations. 
                                                 
21 Here broadly understood as to cover positions ranging from Rawls’ difference principle to more aggregative 
forms of prioritarianism. On the distinction between leximin egalitarianism and aggregative prioritarianism, see 
Gosseries, 2011. 
22 As far as these incentives do not infringe basic liberties or self-respect, in the Rawlsian version. 
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The other important objection is less concerned with the economic effects of a 
right to income than with its morality. Thus the frequent objection to the idea of an 
unconditional right to income, already touched upon in the first section, is that it 
becomes a right to exploit, or to free ride. Gijs van Donselaar (2009), following 
David Gauthier, defines exploitation as parasitism, i.e. benefiting from another’s 
pain without reciprocating. The voluntary unemployed who lives off welfare bene-
fits without looking for a job exploits in this sense people whose labor is taxed in 
order to fund his welfare benefits. 
A first answer to this reciprocity/exploitation objection is that there is no 
unfairness in living off the labor of others provided that everyone is given the same 
possibility to do it (van der Veen & Van Parijs, 1986: 726). If some people prefer 
to work despite their right not to, one might think that they just prefer income to 
leisure. However, a certain amount of work is necessary to maintain the freedom 
not to work, or to work less. Some people might thus choose to work for (partly) 
altruistic reasons, moved by an egalitarian ethos or a duty of contribution. In this 
case, free riding is unfair; it is an infringement of the principle of fair play, which 
Michael Otsuka characterizes as follows: «if one enjoys a benefit available to all, 
and this benefit exists only because of the sacrifice of others, then one is obligated 
to share in the sacrifice necessary to provide this benefit to all» (Otsuka, 2010: 
224). 
Some have argued against this that the able bodied refusing to work are just 
receiving their fair share of the benefits derived by the others from the exploitation 
of resources which are morally common property of all (Van Parijs, 1995)23. My 
reply is different. The fact that an unconditional right to income might engender 
some form of “parasitism”, or a lack of reciprocity is not enough to reject it. Over-
all, it might have more beneficial effects, such as tackling a much more serious kind 
of exploitation, that of the vulnerable employees by the rich employers (White, 
2003). Consider an analogy: the right to freedom of expression might be consid-
ered as a right to lie or to insult. Yet negative side effects are not sufficient for re-
jecting a right otherwise considered as fundamental or desirable in light of its over-
all effects. Thus, although I recognized earlier the existence of something like a 
moral duty to contribute according to one’s abilities, I maintain that this is not 
enough to reject unconditional welfare benefits24. This moral duty should be stimu-
lated through education, social pressure, or state provision of an «infrastructure of 
participation» (van der Veen, 1998: 159-160); not through legal norms and eco-
nomic sanctions. 
The core of this exploitation objection is also present in a widely shared intu-
ition of fairness whose philosophical formulation has been developed by luck-
egalitarians (Dworkin, 2000; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 2011). What fairness requires, 
they argue, is to compensate people for their bad circumstances, for what is out-
side their control and unduly affects their opportunities. But we do not want our 
                                                 
23 Those resources are both natural resources and jobs, considered by Van Parijs (1995) as scarce external 
assets. Van Donselaar (2009, ch. 5) rejects this argument. 
24 Unless governments make sure that non-exploitative jobs are available for everyone (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996: 294), which is a very unlikely assumption in a market economy. 
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policies to be responsibility insensitive, as we tend to conceive ourselves as capable 
of genuine choices and policies refuting any individual responsibility might be very 
intrusive. Thus if some people voluntarily choose not to work, it seems, the argu-
ment goes, that they have to pay the opportunity cost of their choice25. 
If we accept the luck-egalitarian premise, why should we find any appeal to 
this idea of an unconditional right to income? First, it is not true that the proposal 
is responsibility insensitive, because the (total) income of a person will generally de-
pend on her choices between work and leisure26. Fairness might require certain 
proportionality between effort and reward, but this does not necessarily entail that 
the absence of effort should be sanctioned by absence of income (Arneson, 1992; 
Olsaretti, 2009) –especially when lack of effort proves to be difficult to distinguish 
from bad luck, as is the case with job seeking–. Second, other (egalitarian) values 
such as respect might trump fairness if enforcing fairness comes at too great a cost 
in this respect (Wolff, 1998). This is the case for most institutional devices aiming 
at distinguishing between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. Or, alternative-
ly, conditionality itself could be rejected for reasons of fairness if it entails too big a 
loss of welfare by hurting people’s self-respect and the distribution of welfare is 
considered as a matter of fairness (Wolff, 1998). Third, one might find more ap-
peal to a sufficiency-constrained version of luck egalitarianism (Casal, 2007). We 
have no certainty about people’s genuine free will. Therefore, responsibility as-
signment will necessarily be a matter of societal convention (Ripstein, 1994). In 
this perspective, I see four main reasons for such sufficiency constraint. 1) We 
should avoid the possibility that bad choices turn into a chain of disadvantages 
making a person vulnerable to poverty and exploitation (Barry, 2005; Olsaretti, 
2009)27. 2) Potential children should not suffer from their parents’ bad choices 
(Shapiro, 1999: 107; White, 2003: 144; Barry, 2005). 3) The state should make sure 
to cover the needs of people voluntarily making their contributions outside the job 
market (Anderson, 2004). 4) As people generally want to live well, it is unlikely that 
one can make a genuinely voluntary choice not to have enough. A sufficiency con-
straint might thus be a proxy for responsibility: once you have enough, it becomes 
more plausible to hold you responsible for your choices. The luck-egalitarian objec-
tion to unconditionnality can thus also be addressed. 
 
 
INCREASED LEGAL PROTECTION 
 
The solidity of the right to income and social rights in general will depend both 
from the public support they enjoy and from their degree of legal protection. Leg-
                                                 
25 Dworkin (2000: 2) goes as far as to claim that “there is nothing to be said for a world in which those who 
choose leisure, though they could work, are rewarded with the produce of the industrious”. 
26 One exception is for the bad-paid workers under minimal income support systems, as an unemployed might 
earn as much as them. Far for being an argument against unconditionality, this might rather be an argument 
for basic income vs mere unemployment benefits targeting the poor. See above, note 16. 
27 Note that this is also an argument for providing some crucial social rights such as health care and education 
in-kind. I thank Anne-France Colla for pointing this out. 
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islative rights are more fragile than constitutional rights, as they can be turned 
down by a simple majority. Constitutionalization28 appears therefore as a way of 
securing the right on the long run; it is «the best expression of how serious we are 
about our commitment» (Mantouvalou, 2011: 88). My view is thus that like Ulysses 
with the sirens (Elster, 1984) our governments should bind themselves against the 
temptation to sacrifice the right to income when the sirens of austerity start their 
corrupting song.  
Some countries have already included social rights provisions into their con-
stitutions (see Ben-Bassat & Dahan, 2008 for a comparative study). Besides, supra-
national institutions such as the Economic and Social Council of the UN or the 
European Committee of Social Rights are in charge of evaluating states’ respect of 
those rights. Yet social rights have not been as fully constitutionalized as civil and 
political rights have29. Many countries keep considering them as secondary (idea 
which has lost almost entirely the intellectual support it could enjoy in the past). A 
good illustration of this discrepancy is the split between the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Such divide has important practical consequences (Mantou-
valou, 2011: 94). Whereas civil and political rights should be respected immediate-
ly, social and economic rights are aspirational: states have to take progressive steps, 
within the limits of their resources. Moreover, until 2008 and the adoption of the 
“optional Protocol”, there was no complaint mechanism for the second Covenant. 
This new Protocol «brings the ICESCR and the ICCPR a step closer together» 
(Matouvalou, 2011: 95), but many countries remain reluctant to allow the judicial 
enforcement of social rights. The same reluctance is at stake with the European 
Committee of Social Rights, which is considered as the equivalent of the European 
Court of Human Rights for what regards social rights. Differences between the 
ECHR and the ECSR include the facts that judges are replaced by experts and 
judgments take the form of conclusions –when government reports are assessed– 
and decisions –when collective complaints are ruled on– that are not effectively 
binding because they are not justiciable. Many countries do not recognize the au-
thority of the ECSR, or at least do not follow up on its recommendations. 
The mistrust regarding those kinds of supranational institutions is notably 
based on national sovereignty claims –whose political force is increasingly weaken-
ing–. But what is probably the main source of mistrust concerning social rights is 
their cost. Too often, this cost is envisioned statically; one only looks at the budg-
etary implications of effectively realizing these rights. Yet one should also look at 
the dynamic economic effects of social rights, which might prove positive. Social 
investments, redistributions and better protection might result in an increasing 
                                                 
28 In the wide sense that applies at the supranational level even where there is no real constitution, but an 
international charter or covenant. 
29 Countries such as Portugal and Poland in Europe, or Brazil, Mexico and Nicaragua stand out in social rights 
indexes, whereas countries such as Germany, Canada, the US or Israel have the lowest score – social rights are 
absent of their constitutions (Ben-Bassat & Dahan, 2008). Pedro Magalhães (2013: 461) observes that “in 
French civil law countries, in historically recent constitution-making processes, and in non-protestant countries 
[…] social rights have tended to receive a stronger recognition in constitutional texts”. Note however that 
there is some distance between legal recognition and effective realization. 
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demand for goods and services and reduce the costs of security and health care, for 
example. What is more, all rights are costly (Holmes & Sunstein, 1999) in the sense 
that they all require state action (administration, police and tribunals) to be effec-
tively protected. But contrary to civil and political rights, social rights frighten in-
vestors because they are suspected to disincentivize work, to create inflation and to 
imply higher redistributions. They thus come in tension with states’ «structural 
dependence on capital» (Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1988) –the centrality of private 
investments for capitalist economies, whatever the party in government–. This is 
why supranational enforcement seems more plausible than national initiative; it 
might solve a collective action problem in a context of international economic 
competition. 
This last section thus argues in favor of an increased legal protection of so-
cial rights. Justiciability – the possibility to bring complaints to courts –would in-
crease social rights’ protection–. I do not claim that it is the only path for protect-
ing social rights30. Rather, I see constitutionalization as a part of a broader process 
of constituting and legalizing social rights31. But I will focus here on constitutionaliza-
tion and justiciability because these are the most controversial aspects. Although 
the article focuses on the specific right to income, it is unlikely to be constitutional-
ized alone, especially in light of the general reluctance to constitutionalize social 
rights in general.  
One reason for this reluctance is the idea that a focus on rights might have a 
depoliticizing effect. The constitutionalization of fundamental rights would erode pop-
ular energies (Walzer, 1981). In a less philosophical perspective, some people fear a 
colonization of politics by law’s empire, whereas «the primary way of embedding 
human rights generally (and social rights particularly) in any given culture is via the 
political process» (Gearty, 2011: 22). This legitimate fear, however, does not affect 
the argument developed in this paper, which is not arguing for a constitutionaliza-
tion of social rights through the backdoor by a «judicial Deus ex machine» (Gearty, 
2011: 27). The argument should be read as a political one. Its aim is to build a suffi-
ciently wide consensus around the fundamental right to income and to find ways 
to protect it durably (a temporarily wide consensus might crumble later). I agree 
with Conor Gearty that human rights should be politicized rather than remain the 
tool used by lawyers to do politics. But the legislative and the judicial arenas should 
be seen as complementary. Bills of rights are the product of political battles and 
should be shaped by political evolutions. What is more, their meaning goes beyond 
the issue of justiciability. The recognition of fundamental rights in those bills also 
gives the tone for legislative action. Constitutional social rights can make the «legis-
lators realise that they are under a constitutional duty to treat the meeting of every-
                                                 
30 Various non-judicial paths are explored in Campbell, Ewing & Tomkins, 2011 for social rights in general, 
and in De Wispelaere & Morales, 2015 for the right to basic income in particular. 
31 Catherine Young (2012) suggests constituting social rights rather than merely constitutionalizing them, and by 
that she means “to socially institute” them “so that the commitments are committed to social understanding, 
and are realized effectively in law”. In the same spirit, Virginia Mantouvalou (2011) talks about the legalization 
of social rights, which also goes behind their judicial protection by recognizing to legislatures the “primary obliga-
tion to promote social rights” (Mantouvalou, 2011: 89). 
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one’s basic needs as an issue that has priority over other matters» (Mantouvalou, 
2011: 132). As already mentioned, the participation of the public will always be 
necessary to force governments to respect the rights they are committed to. As 
they can try to escape their responsibilities through the austerity argument, such 
“control” participation is likely to be necessary. Constitutionalized rights could 
thus become tools for political protest. 
Another famous objection against social rights’ justiciability claims that it is 
illegitimate for courts to tell governments how to allocate resources. As this distribu-
tive issue is a matter of deep disagreements within society, it should be the prerog-
ative of legislative decisions (Waldron, 1999). However, this should not count as an 
objection to social rights in particular, because civil and political rights sometimes 
have budgetary implications too. The legitimacy argument concerns judicial review 
in general, and many opponents of the judicial enforcement of social rights are in 
fact opposed to the very practice of judicial review (Mantouvalou, 2011: 116). Yet 
it is not necessary to have strong judicial review to protect social rights in general 
and the right to income in particular. The argument developed here is furthermore 
independent from any general defense of constitutionalism32. It is rather conceived 
as a way of tempering the negative effects of existing constitutions and changing 
the imbalance of power between different social groups or classes. Some rights are 
already protected and enforced by courts, and unbalanced constitutions –character-
rized by the classic discrepancy between rights of different “generations”– are not 
neutral from a distributive viewpoint. They protect the wealthy against expropria-
tion, but they hardly protect the vulnerable against exploitation or social exclusion. 
The pressing question is therefore not ‘should we have judicial review at all?’ but 
‘how can we tame this unjustifiable imbalance of power?’ 
Besides, as it is practiced in several countries, we might insist that courts play 
only a modest role. They might just state that social rights have been (or will be) 
breached by a law and ask the government to come up with an alternative proposal 
more respectful of those rights, without telling the government what exactly it 
should do, what kind of law would better respect these rights (see Shapiro, 1996: 
609-612; Fabre, 2000: 148-150). It is possible –and desirable– to combine the input 
legitimacy of the legislative power with the output legitimacy of the judiciary. One 
addresses citizens as authors, the other as subjects of laws (see Beitz, 1989; 
Brettscheider, 2006). Both contribute to governments’ accountability: because 
courts are not accountable to the majority, they can make governments accounta-
ble to minorities (Mantouvalou, 2011: 125). 
Beside the question of democratic legitimacy, many people are worried by 
judges’ alleged lack of economic expertise. According to this argument, often taken to 
be central in constitutional theory (see Fabre, 2000; Brettschneider, 2006; Tushnet, 
2008), judges would not have the competence necessary to adjudicate social 
rights. This view is so popular that judges themselves seem to have adopted judi-
cial restraint regarding social and economic rights (De Wispelaere & Morales, 2015: 
                                                 
32 Constitutionalism can even be seen as a tool for elites to reinforce their power, by protecting the economy 
from popular will and in this way reassure possible investors (Hirshl, 2000). 
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16) –which can also partly be explained by the relative lack of jurisprudence–. This 
case against the justiciability of social rights is nonetheless controversial. It is not 
very clear why social rights would be much more difficult to adjudicate than civil 
and political rights once you consider some difficult implications on both sides 
(Fabre, 2000). What is more, even if one admits this supposed difficulty, it does 
not suffice to build a case against their constitutionalization. Thus you could simp-
ly limit the role of courts in line with «weak-form judicial review» (Tushnet, 2008) 
and/or make their task easier. For example, Fabre (2000: 173-179) argues that judi-
cial preview requires less expertise and information than judicial review33. A principle 
such as the principle of standstill or non-regression –prohibiting diminishment of 
the level of social protection without reasonable justification– does not appear too 
demanding for judges either. Furthermore, the right to a subsistence income advo-
cated in this article can be seen as a simplification of social rights. Its uncondition-
ality makes it even easier to adjudicate. The sole difficulty is to determine the level 
of subsistence, which would not necessarily be the task of the court. 
Another possible argument against the proposal is that it would have no ef-
fect34. An example of the alleged inefficiency of constitutional protection of social 
rights would be South-Africa, which has one of the most progressive constitutions 
in this respect and is often referred to as an example by social rights advocates. As 
mentioned earlier, social rights are always limited by the state’s economic capacity. 
In addition to this, the judges often think as the majority of the elite (Hirschl, 
2000). What is the upshot of this? In the South-African case, despite the constitu-
tion’s commitment to protecting social rights35, the court has not objected against 
the early (it lasted two years) replacement of the very redistributive Reconstruction 
and Development Programme set up by the Mandela government with a Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution program “which aimed for sustained growth ra-
ther than the redress of injustice, and which adopted the neoliberal economic 
blueprints of privatization, liberalization, and competition in order to reach its 
growth targets” (Young, 2012: 21). 
One can tackle this pessimistic –rather than normative– objection by calling 
attention to successful practices of social rights adjudication around the world. It 
seems that «there is evidence of cases exhibiting both direct impact on poverty and 
discrimination as well as indirect impact in the areas of policy, law, mobilisation 
and consciousness raising» (Langford, 2008: 45). Yet the efficacy of social rights 
adjudication depends on multiple contextual factors such as «the nature of the or-
                                                 
33 Judicial preview (which is practiced in France and Ireland) is easier than assessing individual cases because 
the impact of a particular law on a particular situation might be hard to assess. For what regards judicial review, 
Fabre argues that it would be preferable to judge collective complaints (see the supervision mechanism of the 
ESC) because 1) it is difficult to assess a person’s situation without comparisons with third parties about which 
the court will lack information; 2) a redress for one claimant will not automatically involve a redress for all the 
people in similar situation. 
34 This objection was presented to me by Ian Shapiro. Such skepticism also grounds De Wispelaere and Mo-
rales’s recent (2015) assessment of the prospects of a constitutionalized basic income. It is not clear whether 
their arguments similarly apply to the more general right to income here defended. In any case, they invite 
skepticism more than rejection of the constitutional strategy. 
35 The South-African constitution recognizes “rights to food, water, health care and social assistance, which 
the state must progressively realise within the limits of its resources”. 
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der, the political and organisational power of the claimants and the institutional 
strength of the State» (Langford, 2008: 45). It also depends on the formulation of 
rights. In light of the ambiguity surrounding social protection in existing human 
rights law, it is not surprising that their recognition is not enough to effectively 
fight poverty and exploitation. Things might again be different with an explicit 
unconditional right to income. 
It can also be answered that even where increased legal protection does not 
have immediate desirable effects from the point of view of justice, those rights 
could be a tool to be used in the future. Think about the “Equal protection” clause 
in the American Constitution. Who would have expected, at the time of its writing, 
that it would justify the end of racial segregation? Law and politics evolve in dy-
namic interactions. Without political activism and a wide support in civil society, 
social rights will not by themselves transform societies. They nonetheless consti-
tute non-negligible safeguards against abuses and a useful tool –among others– in 
the democratic quest for social justice. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued for the recognition and generalization of a legal right to an income 
sufficient to cover basic needs, an unconditional understanding of this right, and its 
increased legal protection, preferably at a supranational level. As already men-
tioned, these three arguments have independent validity. You can reject one with-
out affecting the others. My conviction is that their combination increases the pro-
tection of people’s right to a decent standard of living, which is widely –and 
rightly– recognized as fundamental, although minimum incomes are settled “below 
the at-risk-of-poverty threshold” (Vanderborght, 2014: 213) even in the most de-
veloped European welfare states. It is nonetheless interesting to conclude this arti-
cle with an examination of the situations where the three recommendations cannot 
all be satisfied together. 
If the language of a right to income (or “income security”) is rejected, one 
might defend an unconditional right to social assistance (targeting those who are not 
protected by social insurance) and insist that it entails at least a system of guaranteed 
minimum income independent from contributions and willingness to work. This 
right should thus be distinguished from the right to social security currently pro-
tected by the ICESCR (Article 9), which can –but must not– limit itself to social 
insurance. A positive example of such right is the article 27 of the South-African 
Constitution –which recognizes a right to «social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance»–. 
Whatever the chosen terminology, it should also be argued that there is no genuine 
security, in a capitalist economy, without decommodification, which implies that 
the safety net cover basic needs36. 
                                                 
36 The basic needs of individuals and all the people they are in charge of (i.e. children if the right is strictly 
individual for adults, as it should be for gender equality reasons). 
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If unconditionality is rejected by the majority, for example because people 
are –or have been made– pathologically afraid of free riders, you can have constitu-
tionalization without unconditionality. The hardest version is a strict obligation to 
work in order to have access to social security –the mere insurance model–. This is 
very damaging for the less able. A somewhat less crude version, which is almost 
standard in Europe, makes welfare benefits conditioned upon people’s willingness to 
find work. As long as they are perceived as actively looking for a job, they will enjoy 
the social minimum. But a milder version between this and full unconditionality is 
also possible: only a generous unemployment income –financed through contribu-
tions – is conditional, not the minimum safety net– financed through taxes.  
Finally, you can have an unconditional right to income recognized as a goal 
by a constitution, but not as a justiciable right37. This might work as a long-term 
incentive towards social progress, but it might as well be ineffective. Or you can 
have such right recognized and implemented but not constitutionally protected38. 
My worry is that it would not last. Business corporations would pressurize the gov-
ernment to abandon such disincentive to work. And taxpayers would soon start 
looking at the unemployed with mistrust. Unless efficiency can be reconciled with 
justice through the introduction of a universal basic income (Van Parijs, 1990) and 
universality increases the allegiance to social protection (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Vanderborght, 2014). Yet these speculations bring us beyond the scope of this 
article.  
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